

- A race for technological supremacy could lead to serious negative consequences (e.g. unsafe extra speedy development).
- Little attention has been given to understanding the dynamics and emergent behaviours arising from an AI race.
- We use Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) to build models of competition and cooperation among AI development teams.
- Propose research agenda for modelling the AI race to understand its dynamics and how to influence it in a beneficial way.
- Al Race Modelling Research Agenda



Al Safety Agreement



What are the key factors influencing the Al Race?

- 1) Openness
- 2) Risk perception
- 3) Inequalities (resources, capabilities, etc)

How incentives, viz. peer vs institutional, negative vs positive, and their combinations, can be used to ensure safety compliance?





EGT dynamical modelling of agreements & incentives



Han, Pereira, Lenaerts. AIES' 2019, Hawaii



Two-team AI Race Models (preliminary)

Al Race as a repeated game with two options SAFE and UNSAFE in each round.

Playing SAFE is more costly and takes more time than playing UNSAFE.

We consider a well-mixed population of players adopting one of three strategies 1) AS: always plays SAFE When benefit from winning the race is large, Always Unsafe (AU) dominates population

Race Winning benefit: SMALL Race Winning benefit: LARGE



2) AU: always plays UNSAFE
3) CS: conditionally playing SAFE

NEXT STEPS

 Incorporate key factors into the models (group size, openness, inequalities, etc) Incentives for promoting safety behaviour and agreement compliance (peer vs institutional, rewards vs punishment)

