Special Sessions

Norms and Normative Multi-Agent Systems

Session Organisers:

• Guido Boella, University of Turin, Italy
• Leon van der Torre, Univ. of Luxembourg, Luxembourg

Norms are pervasive in everyday life and influence the conduct of the entities subject to them. One of the main functions of norms is to regulate the behaviour and relationships of agents. Accordingly, any agent or multi agent system, if intended to operate in or model a realistic environment has to take into account to norms regulating. Norms have been proposed in multi-agent systems and computer science to deal with coordination issues, to deal with security issues of multi-agent systems, to model legal issues in electronic institutions and electronic commerce, to model multi-agent organizations, etc.

We invite submissions related to (but not limited to) one or more of the following topics on agents and norms:

• logical foundations of normative systems
• computational models of normative systems
• computational models of normative multi-agent systems
• formal models of norm dynamics
• agent autonomy and norms
• agent deliberation and norms
• normative agent types
• programming normative multi-agent systems

Formatting and submision instructions can be found here.

Logics for Games and Social Choice

Session Organiser:

• Thomas Ågotnes, University of Bergen, Norway

Logic and game theory form two theoretical underpinnings of multi-agent systems. On one hand, formal logic is a foundation for knowledge representation and reasoning, and opens the door to techniques for formal specification and automated verification. On the other hand, the interaction of rational decision makers has been studied in game theory for a long time. However, traditional game theory is not concerned with formal languages or reasoning systems, nor with computational issues, and until relatively recently formal logic has not been concerned with game theoretic issues. For reasoning about interesting properties of many, if not most, multi-agent systems, we need game theoretic concepts such as strategies, preferences, etc. In particular, many multi-agent systems can be seen as implementing social choice mechanisms.

We invite papers on logical formalisation of concepts related to games and social choice, including but not limited to the following topics:

• Logics for strategic reasoning
• Logics for coalitional ability
• Preference representation
• Logical approaches to bounded rationality and limited cognition
• Formal verification of games
• Logic for mechanism design
• Logical aspects of computational social choice
• Judgment aggregation
• Logical foundations of games and social choice
• Epistemic logic

Formatting and submision instructions can be found here.

 

Barcelona

Catalonia

Spain